day ever comes. Understanding U.S. Nuclear Operations describes how the United States manages its nuclear forces, focusing on how theories and policies are put into practice. It addresses such questions as: What have been the guiding priorities of U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the cold war? What nuclear attack options would the United States have during a war? How are the war plans of the cold war era used in the current world? How would an actual nuclear attack be planned and carried out? This book brings together the distinguished insights and experience of the military and civilian leaders who made decisions during the cold war to help guide our understanding of the nuclear world we are still living in.

The book introduces the reader to the structure and roles of U.S. nuclear forces and their managers, the President and civilian leaders, the military organizations, and the relationship between civilian policymakers and military leaders. It provides an overview of the nuclear weapons complex, including the weapons themselves, the organizations that produce them, and the facilities that operate them. The book also explains the political and cultural context of nuclear weapons. It looks at the Cold War and the end of the cold war and discusses the role of nuclear weapons in detente and in the arms control negotiations that followed.

The book examines the implications of deploying missile defences by the United States and Russia within the current and next decades. Noting that U.S. plans to locate parts of the global ballistic missile defence system in Europe contributed to a deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations, Cimbala discusses how a post-Bush/post-Putin era could open the door to improved detente or increased acrimony over such issues as missile defences and NATO enlargement, the fate of the CFE and INF treaties, and U.S. hegemony in world politics. This book examines the possible roles of nuclear weapons in contemporary U.S. national security policy. The United States has a range of nuclear strategies and postures among which to choose: from abolition of U.S. nuclear weapons, aggressive reductions and “dealing,” “business as usual,” “more aggressive nuclear posture,” to nuclear emphasis. The nation should have the operational flexibility to in fact use a modest number of nuclear weapons if the need were overwhelming and other options were inadequate. The current U.S. nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war. The Reagan administration strategy rejects minimum deterrence and prepares for a nuclear war that might be protracted and catastrophic. Proponents of the understanding that a combination of counterforce targeting, crises location of urban populations, and ballistic missile defense could make nuclear war purposeful and tolerable. The strategy includes five unwarranted assumptions: (1) the Soviets might decide to launch a limited first strike on the United States or its allies; (2) the USSR is more likely to be deterred by the threat of limited U.S. counterforce reprisals than by the threat of overwhelming, total nuclear retaliation; (3) victory is possible in a superpower nuclear war; (4) a counterforce nuclear strategy can be undertaken without compromising the prospects of vertical and horizontal arms control; and (5) peace can be maintained indefinitely via nuclear deterrence. According to the author, Reagan administration strategy makes war more likely and an alternative strategy would reduce the first use of nuclear weapons and, renounce the threat, forestall a nuclear war, and institute additional weapon free zones. (Author/NS)}

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reexamine basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. A comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and pursuing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser’s provocative work is organized in three parts. “The Questions behind the Questions” evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. “Alternative Nuclear Worlds” compares “mutual assured destruction capabilities” (MAD)—a world in which both superpowers’ societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation—to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, “Decisions in MAD” addresses key choices facing American decision makers. Originally published in 1990, The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. The Oxford Handbook of US National Security frames the context, institutions, and policies of the US government and the US government’s role in the world. It advances national interests through foreign policy, government institutions, and grand strategy. Contributors examine contemporary national security challenges and the processes and tools used to improve national security.
security."—Provided by publisher.Nuclear weapons, once thought to have been marginalized by the end of the Cold War, have returned with a vengeance to the centre of US security concerns and to a world bereft of the old certainties of deterrence. This is a major analysis of these new strategic realities. The George W. Bush administration moved to turn back the clock and restore the regime of Saddam Hussein and Israel’s nuclear deterrent. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, international relations and US foreign policy. The report notes that in the near term nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security. For this reason it emphasizes the importance of maintaining, secure, and reliable deterrent nuclear force and makes recommendations on this front. The report also offers measures to advance important goals such as preventing nuclear terrorism and bolstering the nuclear nonproliferation regime—Foreword. From the author of the classic The Wizards of Armageddon, Pulitzer Prize winner journalist comes the first book on nuclear activism in the post-Cold War era. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the definitive record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences. This collection examines the extent to which nuclear weapons modernization has become a significant point of concern and consideration in international security. Recent statements and substantial investments by nuclear weapon possessor states in the upkeep and modernization of their nuclear postures—particularly the United States, Russia and China—lend a return of primacy and the salience of nuclear forces in international politics. The upgrading of systems, the introduction of new capabilities, the intermingling of new technologies, and the advancement of new strategic models, are all indicative of their elevation in importance and reliance. With contributions from leading thinkers in the nuclear weapons domain, this book elucidates the global strategic and policy implications such modernization efforts by the above-mentioned states will have on international security. In unpacking and conceptualizing this developing source of potential (in)security and tension, the collection not only provides a technical context, but also frames the likely effects modernization could have on the relations between nuclear weapon powers and the larger international political and security architecture. The chapters have been arranged so as to inform a variety of stakeholders, from academics to policy-makers, by connecting analytical and normative insights, and thereby, advancing debates pertaining to where nuclear modernization sits as a point of global security consternation in the 21st century. In 1974 Richard Nixon’s defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from “assured destruction” to “limited nuclear options.” In this account of the Schlesinger Doctrine based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration’s official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred. Exploring what we know—and don’t know—about how nuclear weapons shape American grand strategy and international relations The world first confronted the power of nuclear weapons when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The global threat of these weapons deepened in the following decades as more advanced weapons, aggressive strategies, and new nuclear powers emerged. Ever since, countless books, reports, and articles—and even a new field of academic inquiry called “security studies”—have tried to explain the so-called nuclear revolution. But many important, misunderstood issues are: how nuclear deterrence works; whether nuclear coercion is effective; how and why the United States chose its nuclear strategies; why countries develop their own nuclear weapons or choose not to do so; and, most fundamentally, whether nuclear weapons make the world safer or more dangerous. These and similar questions still matter because nuclear danger is returning as a genuine threat. Emerging technologies and shifting great-power rivalries seem to herald a new type of cold war just three decades after the end of the U.S.-Soviet conflict that was characterized by periodic prospects of global Armageddon. Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy is vital reading for policymakers wrestling with the latest challenges. Written in a clear, accessible, and jargon-free manner, the book also offers insights for students, scholars, and others interested in both the history and future of nuclear danger. This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds—including historical, ethical, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States during the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant
changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author’s experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that nuclear-armed states are now more likely to join the United States in making important changes; that further reductions in nuclear arsenals by the United States and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them.Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been reexamining the role of nuclear forces in its national security policy. Traditional U.S. nuclear strategy was primarily intended to deter a Soviet attack against the United States, along with a few lesser objectives. This strategy called for a nuclear arsenal held at constant high alert and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) that would make execution of a retaliatory strike as simple, quick, and effective as possible. Today, the United States faces a more diverse set of potential threats. Political instability in established nuclear states such as Russia and Pakistan is a major concern. The deterioration of military command and control in Russia increases the chances of accidental or unauthorized launch. The possible emergence of new nuclear adversaries poses a further threat because of the wide variety of strategies and capabilities they may present. Nuclear weapons may become instruments of the weak rather than the strong. Weak regimes opposed to the United States may attempt to deliver warheads on trucks or ships, thus undermining the nuclear taboo, and claim they have nothing left to lose may not be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Long before the current Bush administration took office, it was clear that the United States needed to rethink its fundamental nuclear posture. RAND Project AIR FORCE examined a range of strategies and force postures that the United States could adopt to make the most effective use of its nuclear forces in an uncertain world. Although the Cold War has ended and the Soviet Union is gone, nuclear weapons remain as dangerous artifacts of times past. High-technology non-nuclear weapons, possibly including anti-missile defenses based on new principles, will dominate the battle space in the 21st century. But nuclear weapons will be deemed "useful" by those who oppose the status quo and peace and who cannot afford to race the United States and other "third wave" economies based on information and electronics. Nuclear deterrence and information will have an uneasy and dangerous coexistence. Nuclear weapons may be used by regional rogues to deter power projection and intervention by the United States and its allies. Information will be used to help confuse or defeat United States adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to many observers that the Department of Defense must better communicate to the officers at the tactical end of the nuclear mission a rationale for nuclear weapons and deterrence, the critical role that they play in the post–Cold War strategy of the United States, and the value of nuclear weapons to the security of the American people. This report tracks the changing conceptual and political landscape of U.S. nuclear deterrence to illustrate the gap in prioritizing the nuclear arsenal and to build a compelling rationale for tactical personnel explaining the role and value of U.S. nuclear weapons. This book is about the future of nuclear weapons, geopolitics, and strategy. It examines the legacy of nuclear weapons on US strategic concepts of strategy and geopolitics, and on nuclear weapons policy. The authors think it critical to understand just how fundamentally nuclear weapons have influenced American thinking about these concepts. It argues that, given the extent of nuclear weapons' influence on these concepts and the implications for international security, further reductions beyond current Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) levels, and the more absolute idea of nuclear disarmament, may not necessarily be prudent ideas. Nuclear weapons have contributed to the avoidance of major war between states, made alliances more credible and last longer, and have made arms control relatively easier to conceptualize and manage. As such, the author argues, these concepts may become even more difficult to manage in a world where nuclear weapons are marginalized. Are NATO's mutual security commitments strong enough today to deter all adversaries? Is the nuclear umbrella as credible as it was during the Cold War? Backed by the full range of US and allied military capabilities, NATO's mutual defense treaty has been enormously successful, but today's commitments are strained by military budget cuts and antinuclear sentiment. The United States has also shifted its focus away from European security during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and more recently with the Asia rebalance. Will a resurgent Russia change this? The Future of Extended Deterrence brings together experts from the fields of nuclear weapons policy and academic and Cold War nuclear affairs to explore the role of deterrence, alliance commitments, nonproliferation, and missile defense in NATO but with implications far beyond. The contributors analyze not only American policy and ideas but also the ways NATO members interpret their own continued political and strategic role in the alliance. In-depth and multifaceted, The Future of Extended Deterrence is an essential resource for policy practitioners and scholars of nuclear deterrence, arms control, missile defense, and the NATO alliance. Setting the terms for an effective public debate on nuclear issues, this provides essays and excerpts from longer works that have charted the development of American nuclear strategy. Each book chapter offers reprints of important government documents, reports, and studies dealing with American strategic nuclear forces, including the elements of the nuclear triad (missiles, bombers, and submarines), arms control issues and treaties, and modernization plans. Documents include: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (2015) * U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (2013) * The United States Air Force in the 21st Century * Culture Clash: The United States and China's Approach to Nuclear Deterrence, how those drivers may evolve over the next 15 years, and what impact they are likely to have. This unique book reproduces sixteen important government documents, reports, and studies dealing with American strategic nuclear forces, including the elements of the nuclear triad (missiles, bombers, and submarines), arms control issues and treaties, and modernization plans. Documents include: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (2015) * U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (2013) * The United States Air Force in the 21st Century
Congress * Force Size * Force Structure * The Cost of Nuclear Weapons Since the early 1960s the United States has maintained a “triad” of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The United States first developed these three types of nuclear delivery vehicles, in large part, because each of the military services wanted to play a role in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, analysts developed a more reasoned rationale for the nuclear “triad.” They argued that these different basing modes had complementary strengths and weaknesses. They would enhance deterrence and discourage a Soviet first strike because they complicated Soviet attack planning and ensured the survivability of a significant portion of the U.S. force in the event of a Soviet first strike. The different characteristics might also strengthen the credibility of U.S. targeting strategy. For example, ICBMs eventually had the accuracy and prompt responsiveness needed to attack hardened targets such as Soviet command posts and ICBM silos, SLBMs had the survivability needed to complicate Soviet efforts to launch a disarming first strike and to retaliate if such an attack were attempted, and heavy bombers could be dispersed quickly and launched to enhance their survivability, and they could be recalled to their bases if a crisis did not escalate into conflict. According to unclassified estimates, the number of delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers) in the U.S. force structure grew steadily through the mid-1960s, with the greatest number of delivery vehicles, 2,268, deployed in 1967. With this volume Dr. Gray provides an excellent summary and elucidation of the major schools of thought engaged in the current debate over present and future United States nuclear policy. The core of the work lies in the presentation of five different options for nuclear strategy and each option is examined with respect to the objective explanation of its important aspects. Dr. Gray focuses on what he believes to be the most valid points within each argument. In doing so, he constructs a logical framework for understanding and further examining the many strategic alternatives. Finally, Dr. Gray draws on elements of each of the five options to synthesize and present his own preferred strategy. Originally published in 1984 by and distributed for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. This book began as a personal effort to comprehend the effect of nuclear weapons on the current era and its international system. Nuclear weapons have not merely revolutionized the military sphere but have also left their stamp on the world order. Knowledge of the basic principles of nuclear strategy has become a prerequisite to understanding world events. Consequently, no country can remain indifferent to nuclear strategy or can consider itself exempt from its implications. The very importance of the subject precludes the assumption of a narrow technical or military point of view. Political, historical, moral, and even religious implications must be considered. Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace serves as an introduction to the study of modern strategy within the framework of international relations, as well as a basic account for laymen to the intricacies of modern strategy and its ramifications. It deals with a wide range of problems: deterrence and its implications; surprise, and preemptive and preventative attack. The problems of quantities of nuclear weapons, limitations of war (conventional, tactical and strategic), and proliferation of nuclear weapons are also discussed. In the end Malkabi introduces alternate global approaches and the problem of coalitions in the nuclear era. By focusing on disarmament and arms control; peace in the shadow of terror; and stability of the international system and peace research he brings relevance to his study in terms of the current world climate. Many books and articles have been published on nuclear strategy. Most have been descriptive. Very few countries and few books on nuclear strategy have appeared in the United States, with strategic prescriptions for the United States. This book will be of tremendous interest to anyone wishing to understand the major problems of our contemporary world from a global perspective. For close to sixty years, the United States has maintained alliances with Japan and South Korea that have included a nuclear umbrella, guaranteeing their security as part of a strategy of extended deterrence. Yet questions about the credibility of deterrence commitments have always been an issue, especially when nuclear weapons are concerned. Would the United States truly be willing to use these weapons to defend an ally? In this book, Terence Roehrig provides a detailed and comprehensive look at the nuclear umbrella in northeast Asia in the broader context of deterrence theory and U.S. strategy. He examines the role of the nuclear umbrella in Japanese and South Korean defense planning and security calculations, including the likelihood that either will develop its own nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is most important as a political signal demonstrating commitment to the defense of allies and as a tool to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region. While the role of the nuclear umbrella is often discussed in military terms, this book presents a different perspective on the political and diplomatic implications of nuclear deterrence in East Asia. It highlights the asymmetric capabilities of North Korea’s capabilities and China’s military modernization, as well as Donald Trump’s early pronouncements that cast doubt on traditional commitments to allies, the credibility and resolve of U.S. alliances will take on renewed importance for the region and the world. The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of nuclear strategy, this book demonstrates new insights and important lessons. It describes and analyzes the effects of these choices on a state’s ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, he shows that contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security. A second nuclear age has begun in the post-Cold War world. Created by the expansion of nuclear arsenals and new proliferation in Asia, it has changed the familiar nuclear geometry of the Cold War. Increasing potency of nuclear arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan, the nuclear breakthrough in North Korea, and the potential for more states to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold from Iran to Japan suggest that the second nuclear age of many competing nuclear powers has the potential to be even less stable than the first. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age assembles a group of distinguished scholars to grapple with the matter of how the United States, its allies, and its friends must adapt the strategies, doctrines, and force structures currently taking shape if they are to design responses that reinforce deterrence amid vastly more complex strategic circumstances. By focusing sharply on strategy—“that is, on how states use doomsday weaponry for political gain” the book distinguishes itself from recent assessments emphasizing quantifiable factors like hardware, technical characteristics, and manpower. While the variables vary from chapter to chapter, contributors pay special heed to the logistical, technological, and social dimensions.
of strategy alongside the specifics of force structure and operations. They never lose sight of the human factor—the pivotal factor in diplomacy, strategy, and war.